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Abstract 
 
We provide evidence on the dynamics in firms’ R&D cooperation 
behaviour. Our main objective is to analyse if R&D collaborative 
agreements are persistent at the firm level, and in such a case, to study 
what are the main drivers of this phenomenon. R&D cooperation 
activities at the firm level can be persistent due to true state 
dependence, this implying that cooperating in a given period enhances 
the probability of doing it in the subsequent period and it can also be a 
consequence of firms’ individual heterogeneity, so that certain firms 
have certain characteristics that make them more likely to carry out 
technological alliances. A second contribution of the paper deals with 
the differentiated persistence pattern of collaboration agreements for 
three different types of partners: customers and/or suppliers, 
competitors and institutions. We specifically explore the degree of the 
persistence in R&D collaborative activities when considering them 
separately as well as the possibility of finding crossed-persistence across 
these different partner types. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Nowadays, thanks to the globalization and the rapid diffusion of technological knowledge, firms are 
forced to accelerate their rhythm of innovation and to expand their technological capabilities. This 
can be made through different mechanisms, either internal efforts in R&D or accessing external 
sources of technological knowledge and skills. In particular, collaborative agreements have become 
a strategy of knowledge sharing and transfer across firms which are increasingly recognised as an 
important (quasi-market) mechanism to access such external knowledge (Schilling, 2008).  
 
In this sense, empirical contributions on the study of different strategies of R&D cooperation have 
expanded significantly in the last decades. Some of these studies have shown, among other results, 
that R&D cooperation with other firms or institutions has a positive and significant effect on firms’ 
performance (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Belderbos et al., 2004a; Löof and Broström, 2008; 
Aschoff and Schmidt, 2008).1 Despite this extensive literature on the impact of R&D cooperation, 
little attention has been paid on the persistence with which these types of agreements are carried 
out. This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on this issue. Most previous studies have 
examined the simple occurrence or existence of R&D cooperation, but it is clear that the use of this 
strategy as a way to undertake innovation activities may be more or less durable in time.  
 
According to Jacob et al. (2013), persistent utilization of cooperation agreements may allow firms 
to maintain their focus on their core domains through in-house specialisation, while external 
collaboration may provide them with a window of newly emerging technological opportunities that 
fall beyond their main areas of expertise. The collaboration will be so much more fruitful if the firm 
has a partner with resources that complement its own and that are relevant to the innovation being 
sought (Nieto and Santamaría, 2007). In addition, from a management perspective, cooperating in a 
persistent way allows firms obtaining know-how knowledge, which involves information about who 
knows what and who knows what to do, as well as the social ability to co-operate and communicate 
with different partners (Lundvall, 2004). 
 
                                                 
1 According to the theoretical work of D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), cooperation may even have a positive effect 
on social welfare. Nonetheless, it has also been pointed that welfare could be reduced if firms collude in output and 
hence, alliance strategies should not be supported if they involve product market collusion (Greenlee and Cassiman, 
1999; Goeree and Helland, 2010). 
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Innovation is the result of a dynamic process, which involves relationships both in the short and 
long term. Indeed, R&D activities at the firm level have been found to be highly persistent mainly 
due to true state dependence, this implying that performing R&D in a given period enhances the 
probability of R&D being performed in the subsequent period. However, it can also be a 
consequence of firms’ individual heterogeneity, so that certain firms have certain characteristics 
that make them more likely to carry out R&D activities. If these characteristics tend to persist over 
time, they will inexorably provoke persistence in R&D as well. In any case, it is generally accepted 
that technological advances cannot take place without systematic involvement in R&D (Mañez-
Castillejo et al., 2009) and therefore, those firms for which cooperation is one of the main ways to 
access knowledge also need to be persistent in their cooperation agreements.  
 
In this paper we aim at providing evidence on the dynamics in firms’ R&D cooperation behaviour. 
The main objective is, therefore, to analyse if R&D collaborative agreements are persistent at the 
firm level, and in such a case, to study what are the main drivers of this phenomenon. Knowing 
which determinants of persistence are prevalent has important policy implications. If carrying out 
R&D collaboration activities is state dependent, collaboration-stimulating policy measures, such as 
government support programmes, are supposed to have a deeper effect because they do not only 
affect current collaboration agreements but are also likely to induce a permanent change in favour 
of cooperation. If, on the contrary, persistence is driven by individual characteristics, temporary 
shocks to technological collaboration will rapidly dissipate, and support programmes are unlikely to 
have long-lasting effects and policy should focus more on policies trying to improve the specific 
factors that drive R&D cooperation. In such a case, understanding the determinants of the 
persistence of firms when undertaking agreements of collaboration would allow policy makers to 
focus resources on “survival-winners” and avoid wasting resources on “survival-losers”. The 
present paper contributes to this issue. In particular, we follow a dynamic approach in the analysis 
of cooperation persistence, taking into account the unobserved individual heterogeneity and 
handling the initial conditions problem. We use a representative sample of Spanish firms for the 
period 2002-2010.  
 
In addition, following with the well-documented idea that cooperative experience can be considered 
as an incremental learning process in terms of the management of collaborative agreements (Powell 
et al., 1996), we aim at providing evidence on the extent to which having participated in 
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technological collaborations with one type of partner in the past may be a significant dimension 
when it comes to analysing current collaborative agreements not only with the same but also with 
other type of partners. The literature on organizational learning (Levitt and March, 1988) discusses 
how firms recurrently cooperating learn how to manage cooperation agreements by repeatedly 
engaging in them. This gives us arguments to state that this experience of cooperation activities is 
not restricted to the fact of cooperating with the same partner or even with the same type of partner 
(i.e. competitors, clients, suppliers or universities and research centers). Firms with experience of 
technological cooperation agreements gained through long-standing relationships are likely to join 
other partners, even if they are of a different nature that the previous ones, just because they have 
learnt to develop and establish routines, policies and procedures based on their previous experiences 
(Nieto and Santamaría, 2007). Therefore, a second contribution of the present paper deals with the 
differentiated persistence pattern of collaboration agreements for three different types of partners: 
customers and/or suppliers, competitors and institutions. We specifically explore the degree of the 
persistence in R&D collaborative activities when considering them separately as well as the 
possibility of finding crossed-persistence across these different partner types. 
 
After this introduction, Section 2 proceeds with the literature review on the topic of the persistence 
in R&D cooperation activities. Section 3 describes the database used and the methodological issues. 
In Section 4 we present and discuss the results obtained and finally, the main conclusions of the 
paper are presented in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
In a similar line to that of innovation persistence, the degree of cooperation persistence of a firm 
could be defined as the positive impact of past collaborations on present cooperation agreements 
(Flaig and Stadler, 1994). In principle, there are several potential sources for persistent behaviour 
(Heckman, 1981). Firstly, it might be caused by true state dependence, this meaning that the 
decision to innovate through cooperation in one period in itself enhances the probability to 
cooperate in the subsequent period. Secondly, firms may have some specific characteristics which 
make them mostly prone to cooperate. To the extent that these characteristics persist over time, they 
will inevitably induce persistence in cooperation agreements as well. Such features can be classified 
into observable attributes, such as firm size or firm’s absorptive capacity, and unobservable ones, 
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like managerial abilities or the stock of tacit knowledge, that are typically not observed. If these 
unobserved features present correlation over time, and are not properly controlled for in the 
estimation, past cooperation activities may appear to affect future cooperation simply because it 
picks up the effect of these persistent unobservable characteristics. It is known in the literature as 
spurious state dependence. As a consequence, the unobserved individual heterogeneity and the well-
known initial conditions problem have to be addressed rigorously.  
 
There are basically three theoretical explanations for real true dependence in the case of cooperation 
in innovation activities. The first one is based on the hypothesis of “success-breeds-success”. The 
idea is that successful R&D cooperation projects positively affects the conditions for further 
cooperation agreements in subsequent years. Firms tend to establish routines that are associated 
with positive performances, and are, therefore, replicated and perpetuated without drastic changes, 
leading to path dependency in their behaviour and strategy (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988; Belderbos et al., 2012). Thereby, firms gaining positive 
returns from innovations made in cooperation with other firms or institutions are keener to continue 
conducting this cooperative strategy than firms without a relative experience in this kind of 
activities. Furthermore, experience in cooperation may make firms more attractive as partners as 
they would be better able to generate value from partnerships (Gulati, 1995). 
 
A second reason why some firms are expected to be persistent R&D co-operators lies in the fact 
that cooperation agreements involve costs that may not be recoverable. Firms need to incur start-up 
costs for establishing cooperation agreements (for instance, costs related to searching, training and 
adapting to the partner of cooperation) and sometimes require a relatively large initial investment. 
This kind of costs can be considered, at least partly, as sunk costs (Sutton, 1991; Cohen and 
Klepper, 1996) and entail barriers to entry into and exit from cooperation projects. Firms involved 
in cooperation agreements should better not stop cooperating in order to increase the probability of 
recovering their initial investments and gain from positive results from such agreements. The 
presence of important sunk costs represents an essential motive for entering and staying in a 
specific regime of R&D activity (Le Bas et al., 2011). As pointed by Clausen et al. (2012), 
technological alliances in which knowledge is jointly developed between firms, interactions 
between customers and suppliers or cooperation with research institutions may have important sunk 
costs and may, therefore, be more durable. 
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A third explanation focuses on firms’ knowledge accumulation. Cooperation experience should be 
considered as an incremental learning process in two ways: in terms of the technical learning of 
innovation itself, and in terms of the management of collaborative ties (Powell et al., 1996). With 
respect to the first one, by cooperating firms acquire a set of capabilities and knowledge stocks that 
allow them to benefit by learning from specific areas of specialization of their partners. This way, 
having participated in technological collaborations in the past may be a hugely important dimension 
when it comes to analyzing current innovation capability. This absorptive capacity is dependent on 
the firm’s level of prior-related knowledge which is partly made up thanks to previous experience 
of collaboration. Secondly, experience in networking will also have an effect on the management of 
collaborative agreements. The literature on organizational learning shows that firms continuously 
engaged in alliances learn from previous experience as firms learn how to manage these hybrid 
organizational forms by repeatedly engaging in them. In addition, the more alliance experience a 
firm has, the more it becomes structurally embedded in an alliance network, providing it with 
network-level information on new partnering opportunities (Granovetter, 1985). Similarly, this 
mechanism brings information with respect to a firm’s reputation to potential partners, enhancing 
their ability to assess the firm’s attractiveness. In a similar vein, a greater degree of trust between 
firms cooperating continuously is reached, which is a basic requisite for a successful partnership 
(Nooteboom, 2004). As a consequence of the whole process, experience in cooperation allows firms 
not only to obtain quite specialised competences but also to find the most reliable experts, forming a 
source of information on potential partners over time. This learning is also related to the concept of 
“learning by interacting” which points to how interaction in innovation enhances the relationship 
with external partners (Lundvall, 1988; Lundvall, 2004; Jensen et al., 2007). Since a firm’s ability 
to recognise the value of new external information as well as to assimilate and apply it to 
commercial ends, is a function of the level of knowledge, learning in one period will allow for a 
more efficient accumulation of external knowledge in subsequent periods (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). This cumulative nature of knowledge would induce state dependence in cooperative 
behaviour.  
 
While most studies on R&D cooperation strategies have examined the determinants of carrying out 
this strategy and their consequences on the firm’s performance in a single point in time, the 
dynamics of R&D cooperation behaviour has been relatively ignored. In contrast, there has been an 
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important amount of literature on the dynamic character of innovation itself, and in particular, on 
the persistence of innovation (Cefis, 2003; Mañez-Castillejo et al., 2009; Peters, 2009; Raymond et 
al., 2010). In general, the method used to examine innovation persistence consists in modelling the 
probability of a firm to innovate as a function of the lagged dependent variable (i.e. whether or not 
the firm innovated in a previous period) and other control variables. Innovation persistence occurs 
when the lagged innovation variable has a positive and significant sign (Clausen et al., 2012). Most 
studies investigating persistence of innovation have found evidence in favour of state dependence in 
the decision to innovate using dynamic discrete choice models or survival analyses. Nevertheless, 
the degree of persistence obtained in these papers depends, among other things, on how the authors 
measure innovation and if the firm’s unobserved heterogeneity has been taken into account. In 
relation with the measurement issue, Geroski et al. (1997), Cefis and Orsenigo (2001) and Cefis 
(2003) relying on patent data and/or major innovations obtained a low level of persistence in such 
activities combined with bimodality, i.e., strong persistence for great innovators and non-
innovators; whereas in studies using R&D and innovation survey data, persistence in innovation 
activities is found to be high (Duguet and Monjon, 2002; Mañez-Castillejo et al., 2009; Peters, 
2009). Yet, innovation persistence is found to differ significally across sectors, firm size and types 
of innovation (product and process innovation). Raymond et al. (2010) emphasize that persistence 
may be spurious and its existence can be ascertained only after accounting for individual effects and 
handling properly the initial conditions problem. Once this is done, these authors find a significant 
persistence in the occurrence of innovation in high-tech industries, while such evidence is not found 
in low-tech industries.  
 
Although innovation persistence has become an important topic in applied industrial organization 
since the publication of the seminal paper by Geroski et al. (1997), from our knowledge, Belderbos 
et al. (2012) and Jacob et al. (2013) are the only ones to explore the persistent character of alliance 
strategies although with very specific objectives. Whereas the first one uses a data set on innovative 
Dutch firms to analyse the persistence of, and interrelation between horizontal and vertical 
technology alliances, the second one examine to what extent prior engagement in international 
alliances with partners from developed countries increases the propensity to form technology 
alliances with partners based in emerging economies and vice versa. In our paper, we study the 
extent of the phenomenon of persistence in the firms’ decisions to engage in cooperation 
agreements as a way to carry out innovation activities, attempting to control for the presence of 
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unobserved individual heterogeneity and the initial condition problem. In this sense, we consider 
that the issue of persistence in R&D cooperation activities is relevant and merits further research 
since it determines how systematically firms access external knowledge and resources to carry out 
innovation activities, which can be behind the traditional issue of whether or not, and to what 
extent, innovation is persistent.  
 
3. Empirical issues 
3.1 Methodology
Our empirical approach follows the definition of cooperation persistence as “state dependence” 
presented in the previous section, basically that having engaged in R&D cooperation activities 
increases the probability to engage in such arrangements currently. So, the study considers a 
dynamic random effects probit model which allows for state dependence and unobserved individual 
heterogeneity to analyse the discussed causal relationship. In addition, in order to distinguish 
whether persistence is due to true state dependence or to the spurious one, this dynamic framework 
accounts for unobserved individual effects correlated with the initial conditions, as will be discussed 
next.   
 
The latent equation for this model is specified as follows: 
 
                   * '1it it it i ity y x                TtNi ...,,2;...,,1        (1) 
 
where *ity  is the latent dependent variable which measures the difference between benefits and costs 
that firm i obtains during the current period t by cooperating in R&D with other firms or 
institutions; 1ity  is an indicator for cooperation during the previous period and captures the 
previous cooperation experience (true state dependence);   is the parameter that represents the true 
state dependence to be estimated; itx  is a vector of observable characteristics of the firm that may 
be associated with the cooperation indicator and   the corresponding vector of parameters to be 
estimated; i  are unobserved individual-specific random effects which are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the independent variables; and it  is a time and individual-specific error term that 
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is assumed to be distributed as )1,0(N 2. If *ity  is larger than zero we observe that firm i engages in 
cooperation, so the observed binary outcome variable is defined as: 
 
                                       
	


 

else
yif
y itit 0
01 *
                                       (2) 
 
Since it  is normally distributed, the dynamic model of interest is given by 
 
                      
'
1 11| , , ( )it it it i it it iP y x y y x                             (3) 
 
where   is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal. 
 
In this context, the relative importance of the unobserved effect is measured as )1( 22    , 
which shows the percentage of total variance explained by unobserved heterogeneity. Testing the 
statistically significance of this coefficient leads to an easy test for the presence of the unobserved 
effect, that is, the relevance of the random effects estimator over the pooled one.  
 
A positive and statistically significant estimate of   identifies the presence of persistence in the 
decision to engage in cooperation agreements for innovation. As we mentioned in the literature 
review section, it may arise due to true state dependence or due to unobserved characteristics of the 
firms that are correlated over time. As pointed out by Raymond et al. (2010), the existence of true 
persistence can be ascertained only after accounting for unobserved individual effects and handling 
properly the initial conditions problem. The simplest assumption is to take the initial conditions to 
be exogenous, but it is not expected so because the start of the observation period for each firm 
could be correlated with the unobserved characteristics of the firms. In our context, if the initial 
conditions are taken to be exogenous, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable would be 
overestimated. In other words, it will lead to an overstatement of the true state dependence in R&D 
cooperation decisions. Since for most firms the cooperation process did not start at the same time of 
this study’s observation timeframe, we assume the initial conditions to correlate with the 
unobserved effect.  
                                                 
2 Later in the paper we discuss why the random effects model is preferred over the fixed effects in our case.   
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We follow the Wooldridge’s (2005) procedure which deals with the initial conditions problem in 
non-linear dynamic random effects models where it is necessary to model the unobservable 
heterogeneity. Specifically, we assume that the unobserved individual heterogeneity depends on the 
initial conditions ( 0iy ) and the time-varying exogenous variables, namely: 
 
                              0 1 0 2i i i iy x u                                             (4) 
 
where ix  represents the means of time-variant exogenous variables; iu  is assumed to be distributed 
)1,0(N and independently of the explanatory variables, the initial conditions ( 0iy ), and the 
idiosyncratic error term ( it ).
3 
3.2 Dataset and variables  
We use the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC)4 produced jointly by the Spanish National 
Statistics Institute (INE), the Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology (FECYT) and the 
Cotec Foundation. The data come from different successive waves of the Spanish Innovation 
Survey conducted every year by the INE, which in turn is based on the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS). An important advantage of using this database is that it allows us to study different 
issues related to innovation activities of Spanish manufacturing and service firms over time as it is 
specifically designed to analyse technological activities. Given the specific aim of this study and 
because the questions about cooperation are asked in a three-year period, i.e. the survey asks 
whether or not the firm cooperated in the period between t-2 and t, we consider four waves of the 
PITEC: 2004 (wave 2002-2004), 2006 (wave 2004-2006), 2008 (wave 2006-2008) and 2010 (wave 
2008-2010), covering the period 2002-2010.  
 
                                                 
3 Since the regressors exhibit too little time variation (within variation) and given the high correlation between the 
variables and their within means (see Table 2 and Table A2 in the Appendix), we are not able to identify 2  and hence, 
we followed the strategy adopted by Raymond et al. (2010) assuming that the unobserved individual effects are 
correlated only with the initial values of yit. 
4 This database is available at http://icono.fecyt.es/PITEC/Paginas/por_que.aspx 
Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014/10, pàg. 13 
Regional Quantitative Analysis Research Group Working Paper 2014/05, pag. 13 
 
 13
A cleaning process has been carried out and only those firms belonging to the industrial and service 
sectors, with at least ten employees and positive sales have been taken into account. 5 In addition, 
since we are interested in the persistence of R&D cooperation activities, our analysis is restricted to 
firms engaging in innovative activities6 for which technology collaboration is relevant. We 
distinguish two panel data sets. The first one is an unbalanced panel comprising all firms that are 
present in at least two consecutive waves7; and the second one is a balanced sub-sample, so that 
only firms which are present in all the waves are included. In Table 1 we show some characteristics 
of the two data sets.  
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
In each PITEC survey, for a three-year period, the firm is asked if it had any cooperation agreement 
with other firms or institutions on its innovation activities. Based on this question, we define the 
cooperation variable as an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if the firm decided to 
cooperate and zero otherwise,8 which is our main dependent variable. We follow the standard 
modelling procedure for analyzing (innovation) persistence in which the lagged dependent variable 
is an explanatory variable included in the model in order to test the persistence hypothesis. 
However, we also control for other factors that have been traditionally considered in the literature as 
influencing the decisions to engage in R&D cooperation activities as outlined below. Not 
considering them explicitly in the regression analysis would bias the results concerning the true 
state dependence in the innovative cooperation strategy. 
 
The process of cooperation in innovation activities is complex. Following previous theoretical and 
empirical papers, among the factors leading firms to engage in collaborative innovative activity, we 
focus on incoming spillovers, appropriability conditions, the firm’s absorptive capacity and the 
receipt of public funding for innovation. We also control for some firms’ characteristics such as 
firm size, belonging to a group of enterprises and sectoral dummy variables.  
 
                                                 
5 Firms that report confidentiality issues, mergers, closures and employment incidents are eliminated. 
6 That is, firms that have introduced innovations in products or processes, or who were undertaking innovation activities 
during the analysed period or abandoned them. 
7 Using the unbalanced panel allows us to obtain more precise estimates as a higher number of observations and for a 
greater variety of firms are considered. Additionally, we control partly for survival biases as firms are allowed to enter 
and exit the sample at any period. 
8 Note that a lag of this variable refers to two to four years, two lags refer to four to six years and so on. 
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Incoming spillovers refer to the flows of external knowledge that a firm is able to capture, and the 
information sources for them are usually situated in the public domain (Cassiman and Veugelers, 
2002). This way, this variable is measured by the importance that the firm attributed, on a four-
point scale, to publicly available information for the innovation process of the firm. The information 
sources were conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions, scientific journals and trade/technical 
publications, professional and industry associations. To generate a firm-specific measure of 
incoming spillovers, we aggregated these answers by summing the scores on each of these 
questions and then the variable was rescaled from 0 (unimportant) to 1 (crucial). Firms that place a 
higher value on incoming spillovers and externally generated knowledge in their innovative activity 
might have a greater scope for learning and gaining from knowledge exchange through cooperative 
agreements. So these firms are expected to be more likely to be actively engaged in cooperative 
R&D agreements and to do it more persistently. 
 
Likewise, we account for appropriability conditions, which could be an important factor in 
explaining patterns in cooperation and their persistence as firms can have less incentives to 
cooperate for anti-competitive reasons or they may have more incentives in order to learn from 
others while internalizing the knowledge flows shared between partners. In other words, a better 
appropriability of the results of innovation through protection may have a positive effect on 
cooperating persistently in R&D, as firms can control outgoing information flows and there are less 
incentives for others to become a free rider on other firms’ investments (Cassiman and Veugelers, 
2002). However, excessive legal protection may hinder the internalization of the flows shared by 
the partners and may thus have a negative effect on R&D cooperation (Hernán et al., 2003; López, 
2008). As a proxy for appropriability conditions, we computed the variable legal protection, which 
considers whether the firm used at least one legal method for protecting inventions or innovations 
(patents, registered an industrial design, trademark or copyright), taking a value of 1 if used, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
Regarding the receipt of public funding for innovation, when firms obtain public R&D subsidies 
they may be more likely to establish cooperation agreements with other firms or with institutions 
given that this way they have the resources to do the research (Arranz and Fernandez de Arroyabe, 
2008; Busom, Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Abramovsky et al., 2009). Also, many times public support 
programmes for R&D activities aim to ease cooperative innovation agreements by firms that would 
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otherwise not engage in such activity. In order to distinguish the effect from different sources of 
public R&D subsidies, we define three binary variables: local, national and European funding, 
taking the value 1 if the firm received public funding from local or regional authorities, central 
government and European Union, respectively, to carry out its innovation activities, and zero 
otherwise.   
 
R&D intensity as a proxy for absorptive capacity and firm size are expected to influence positively 
cooperation activities. Firms’ R&D intensity (measured as the share of internal R&D expenditures 
in total sales) represents their R&D efforts (experience and knowledge accumulated) and according 
to Cohen and Levinthal (1989), greater efforts in R&D increase the firm’s capacity to recognize, 
value, and assimilate external knowledge from cooperation agreements. Absorptive capacity has 
been identified in many studies as an important feature of the firms since it makes them more likely 
to be successful innovators, which could make them more attractive cooperation partners for other 
firms and make them being persistent co-operators (Bayona et al., 2001; Fritsch and Lukas, 2001; 
Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Hernán et al., 2003; Belderbos et al., 2004b; Röller et al., 2007; Arranz 
and Fernandez de Arroyabe, 2008). On the other hand, it is argued that large firms have more 
resources and certain capabilities to be more able to face commitments required for partnerships and 
to benefit from cooperation agreements and from economies of scale (Bayona et al., 2001; Fritsch 
and Lukas, 2001; Tether, 2002; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Belderbos et al., 2004b; Belderbos et 
al., 2012). Firm size is a categorical variable (<50 employees, 50-249, 250-499 and >500) according 
to the number of employees. 
 
We expect firms belonging to a group of enterprises to be more likely to engage in R&D 
cooperation and to do it in a continuous way. Firms that are part of a group may have access to a 
substantial pool of resources that make them more attractive as cooperation partners (Ahuja, 2000; 
Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Belderbos et al., 2012). We define a binary variable taking the value 1 
if the firm belongs to a group of companies, and zero otherwise. See Table A1 in the Appendix for a 
more detailed explanation of the definitions of the variables. To avoid problems of simultaneity 
with the decision of engaging in R&D cooperative agreements, all the independent variables are one 
period-lagged. 
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Some descriptive statistics of the variables used in our empirical analysis are shown in Table 2. 
Although all of them can vary across firms and time we can see that in all cases the variation across 
firms (between variation) is much higher compared to the time variation (within variation).  
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
PITEC also asks firms which kind of partner they cooperated with in their innovation processes. 
According to this question, we distinguish between three different types of cooperation agreements 
in order to analyse to what extent the experience in cooperating with one type of partner influences 
the probability of cooperating with the same of with other types of partners:9 Horizontal cooperation 
(with competitors or other enterprises of the same sector; Vertical cooperation (with suppliers of 
equipment, materials, components or software or with customers or clients) and Institutional 
cooperation (with consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D institutes, universities or other 
higher education institutions, government or public research institutes and technological centres). 
 
4. Main results 
Table 3 reports the transition probabilities of engaging in R&D cooperation agreements between 
periods t-1 and t, t-2 and t and t-3 and t for both the unbalanced and the balanced panels. In the 
unbalanced panel, nearly 71% of the cooperators in one wave persisted in cooperation in the 
subsequent wave, that is, after two to four years, while 29% stopped their arrangements. In a similar 
vein, about 84% of the non-cooperators remained in this status in the following wave and 16% 
changed it engaging into agreements of cooperation in the subsequent period. The corresponding 
figures are very similar in the balanced panel. Therefore, it turns out that the probability of 
cooperating in period t was about 55 percentage points higher for previous co-operators than for 
previous non-cooperators, showing the considerably high persistence in cooperation activities from 
period to period. In addition, although the probability of permanence in the same state decreases as 
the period of observation extends, the last transition matrices (t-3 and t) still show a high level of 
persistence in the decisions to engage in R&D cooperation: almost 57% of co-operators and 73% of 
                                                 
9 The survey also offers information on another type of cooperation: cooperation with firms in the same group. 
However, we do not consider such typology since only firms belonging to a group can cooperate within their group, 
while all the other types of partners can be chosen by all firms. However, in order to control for the possible different 
behaviour of such firms, the regression analysis includes a dummy variable for firms belonging to a group. 
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non-cooperators remain in their initial state after six to eight years, with very similar figures for the 
balanced panel. 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
In any case, the probability of persisting in cooperation agreements in the case of Spanish firms 
seems not to be as high as the one observed in R&D activities reported in previous studies. Also for 
a panel of Spanish manufacturing firms observed during the period 1998-2009, Arqué-Castells 
(2013) report that 89% of R&D performers in one year persisted in R&D the subsequent year, while 
11% ceased their R&D activities. Similarly, 95% of non R&D performers maintained their status 
the next period while only 5% entered into R&D. Thus, compared with innovation, neither 
persistence is as high in cooperation activities, nor transitions are so infrequent. The firm may 
decide to carry innovation activities as a strategy to survive, however, there are several ways to 
develop such innovation, so that according to different objectives, it may not always be necessary to 
follow cooperative agreements with other firms and/or institutions. Besides, the continuity of a 
cooperation agreement not only depends on the firm itself, but also on the decision from the other 
counterpart of continuing with such alliance, which can make these types of activities of a less-
continuous nature in themselves.  
 
The results on the regression estimation are given in Table 4. As it is observed, the statistical 
significance of the panel-level variance component over the total variance (  ) indicates that the 
random effects estimator is preferred over the pooled probit estimator, indicating the accuracy of 
considering the former.10 In the first column we report the marginal effects from the estimation of 
the dynamic random effects probit model taking into account the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity and assuming the initial conditions as being exogenous. As mentioned before, since 
the persistence of engaging in R&D cooperation may be spurious when the individual effects and 
the initial conditions are not addressed, these results can be contrasted with the estimates obtained 
                                                 
10 Additionally, since we are considering a sample of the whole population of Spanish firms, i.e., a random sample from 
a large population, the random effects model would be more appropriate based on theoretical grounds (Baltagi, 2005). 
This way, we can make inferences about all the unobservable effects in the population, and not only in the sample, as 
would be the case with a fixed effects model. Also, following Mundlak (1978) and Hsiao (2003), we prefer the random 
effects model because it allows for treating omitted factors that affect the dependent variable as random errors instead 
of constants.   
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assuming that the initial conditions are correlated with the individual effects, as presented in the 
second column. The two additional columns report the same regressions as before for the balanced 
panel. By and large, the results of the two datasets are very similar. Therefore, it can be taken as a 
robustness check confirming our results about the persistence in R&D cooperation activities. 
 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
The estimates in column (1) that allow individual-specific effects but take initial conditions to be 
exogenous, give an average marginal effect of the lagged dependent variable of 0.47, positive and 
highly significant. This result indicates that firms are persistent in carrying out cooperation 
activities as a strategy to undertake their innovation activities. The Wooldridge estimates that are 
shown in the second column, after taking into account the assumption of the initial conditions 
correlated with the unobserved individual effects, yield an average marginal effect of 0.34, that is, 
firms that performed cooperation agreements at t-1 have a probability of cooperating at t around 34 
percentage points higher than do firms that did not cooperate at t-1. Two main conclusions arise. 
First, there is evidence of the existence of a behavioural effect in the sense that the decision to 
cooperate in our period enhances the probability of being co-operator in subsequent periods. That is, 
our results suggest a significant state dependence effect for cooperation activities. Second, in line 
with previous findings in the literature, the hypothesis of exogenous initial conditions leads to 
overestimation of the degree of persistence. 
 
While taking into account the dynamic behaviour of cooperation, we also find that the importance 
attributed to sources of information publicly accessible, the use of protection methods, firm size, 
and the fact of belonging to a group of enterprises affect positive and significantly the probability to 
cooperate. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the firm’s decision to cooperate in R&D activities 
depends significantly on public funding (local, national and European). This result is in accordance 
with many studies analysing the relationship between R&D cooperation and subsidies (Busom and 
Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Arranz and Fernandez de Arroyabe, 2008; Abramovsky et al., 2009) and 
evidence that R&D subsidies designed to encourage innovation activities could alleviate barriers to 
cooperation. Of course this dependence of R&D cooperation on public funding can be a problem for 
the long-term R&D strategy of the firm, since not receiving public funds because of government 
budget cuts could force the firm stopping their cooperation agreements. 
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With the aim of analysing the strength of this persistence found in cooperation activities, the first 
two columns in Table 5 refer to the same estimations as those given in Table 4, but including an 
additional variable that takes the value 1 if the firm decided to cooperate two periods before (t-2), 
irrespectively of what was done in period t-1. As observed, true state dependence is also observed in 
the case of a longer time span, which in our case corresponds to four to six years, although with a 
much lower intensity. This result is in line with the evolutionary perspective that sees innovation as 
a dynamic process that develops over time. In this process, having participated in cooperation 
activities in the past may allow firms to accumulate technological knowledge which increases their 
absorptive capability which will allow them to engage in further innovation projects carried out 
jointly with other partners. That is, it enables firms to strengthen their resource endowment which 
last over time. However, what happens when a firm that has been cooperating in innovation 
activities, stops doing it? Can it re-start cooperating with more feasibility than those that not 
cooperated before? Columns (3) and (4) include an explanatory variable, namely Coopt-2/t-1=0, that 
takes the value 1 if the firm cooperated in t-2, restricted to the fact of not having carried out 
cooperation activities in t-1. Under the same scenario of non-cooperators in t-1, the value of such 
variable is 0 if the firm did not cooperate either in t-2. According to the literature on organizational 
learning (Levitt and March, 1988, Powell et al., 1996), firms repeatedly engaged in an activity such 
as innovation cooperation learn from experience as learn how to manage these organizational forms 
by engaging in them repeatedly, as they develop and establish routines, policies and procedures 
based on their experiences. According to our estimates, firms not engaged in cooperation activities 
in t-1 but with previous experience in t-2 have a significantly higher probability of engaging in 
cooperation agreements in t, if compared with those that had not carried out cooperation activities in 
the past (at least the time periods that fall under control in our sample). This past dependence is 
much lower than in the case of cooperating continuously, but still points to the fact that once a firm 
begins to collaborate, it will gain experience and develop a reputation as a partner which keeps in 
time. This “learning by doing” seems to be maintained in time, at least in short periods of time.  
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
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Persistence pattern of collaboration for different types of partners 
 
We turn now to the analysis of the differentiated persistence pattern of collaboration agreements for 
three types of partners: customers and/or suppliers, competitors and research institutions. We 
specifically explore the degree of persistence in R&D collaborative activities when considering 
them separately as well as the possibility of finding such effect across the different partnerships.  
 
Table 6 shows the transition probabilities of cooperation agreements for the three types of partners. 
First of all, it turns out that there are hardly any differences between the unbalanced panel and the 
smaller balanced panel. We also observe that persistence in cooperation at the firm-level is larger in 
the case of research institutions and universities, with more that 68% of firms that cooperated in one 
period that persisted in cooperation activities in the subsequent period, followed by co-operators 
with clients or suppliers, that presented a persistence rate of 63%. In the case of cooperating with 
competitors, about 52% of them persisted in t+1, l6 percentage points lower that with institutions. 
Among other reasons, one could point to the fact that cooperating with competitors may follow 
strategic reasons that can vary substantially over time depending on the market conditions, 
economic cycle and the situation of the two firms. Also, it could be that as a consequence of their 
bilateral nature, in which two competitors have to be in accordance to follow the alliance, this type 
of agreements suffers from relatively important fluctuations. On the contrary, cooperation 
agreements with institutions may follow structural objectives of the firm cooperating, which tend to 
be of a long-term nature. In any case, transitions are relatively frequent in all the cases. For 
instance, nearly 32% of co-operators with institutions in one year ceased such cooperative activities 
in the following, which is the lowest share (this probability increases in the case of vertical 
cooperation until 37%, and sums up to nearly 48% in horizontal cooperation). This higher stability 
for the case of technological cooperation with research institutions and universities, can be due to 
the fact those firms do not look for merely short-term alliances but for a way to carry out a long-
term innovation strategy. Indeed, when the firm values positively the results obtained from 
collaboration agreements with research institutions, the fact of having participated in technological 
collaborations with them in the past allow the firm to develop and establish procedures based on 
such previous experiences which may be a significant dimension when it comes to analysing current 
collaborative agreements of such type.  
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[Insert Table 6 around here] 
Columns (1) to (3) in Table 7 show the estimates of our specification for the separate cases of the 3 
types of partners. In other words, we want to analyse whether it is possible to observed different 
persistence trends according to type and diversity of partners. Again, after taking into account the 
assumption of the initial conditions correlated with the unobserved individual effects, we obtain 
lower parameters for persistence than with the hypothesis of exogenous initial conditions.11 The 
Wooldridge estimates yield an average marginal effect of 0.29 for institutions, that is, firms that 
performed cooperation agreements with research institutions at t-1 have a probability of cooperating 
at t around 29 percentage points higher than do firms that did not cooperate at t-1 with research 
centers. The same applies for the case of cooperation with clients or suppliers, with almost the same 
probability. In the case of cooperating with competitors, this probability is of 11 percentage points, 
much lower but still significant.  
 
Several conclusions are worth pointing out. First, that irrespective of the type of partner, there exists 
a behavioural effect in the sense that the decision to cooperate with one type of partner in one 
period enhances the probability of being the same kind of co-operator in subsequent periods. These 
results suggest a significant state dependence effect for cooperation activities even once we 
consider separately the different types of alliances. Second, among the reasons of the highest 
persistence in the case of collaboration with customers, clients and institutions one may think of the 
relative limited spillovers risks if compared to the one in agreements with competitors, which may 
imply a higher persistence of the former alliance strategies. In the case of collaboration with 
competitors, due to the similar knowledge both firms share, the capacity for absorption of 
knowledge spillovers and, as a consequence, of creating free-ridership (Nooteboom, 2004) is 
particularly important. As a consequence, agreements of cooperation with competitors are not only 
scarcer but also less permanent.  
 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
 
                                                 
11 We do not offer the results without the Wooldridge correction to save space. They can be provided by the authors 
upon request.  
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According to the alliance portfolio view, having a diversity of partnership is positive for the firm, 
since the potential complementarities between different types of partners may bring in different sets 
of knowledge or complementary capabilities (Vassolo et al., 2004). Indeed, different partner types 
play different functions in complementing the internal resources and capabilities of a firm, which 
may have different connotations for a firm’s tendency to engage in such agreements. Therefore, the 
aim now to analyse whether firms with experience in technological cooperation agreements are 
likely to join partners of a different nature. Columns 4 to 6 in Table 7 provide the results of the 
regressions in which we include not only the past alliance engagement in the same type of 
partnership but also variables that consider if the firm reported to be previously engaged in an 
alliance with each of the other two types of partners. As a consequence, the size and significance of 
the coefficients on prior engagement in the same type of cooperation partnership indicate 
persistence, whereas the coefficients on prior involvement in the other two types of alliances show 
the interrelation among them.  
 
According to our results, once again the magnitude of persistence in alliances is significantly 
positive and of a similar magnitude than the ones obtained when the interrelations across types of 
partners were not included. That is, persistence in the case of institutional as well as vertical 
cooperation is higher than in the case of collaboration agreements with competitors, and in all cases, 
these persistence effects are stronger than the interrelation effects. In all the cross-partners 
opportunities we obtain that cooperation agreements with one type increase the likelihood of 
cooperating in the future with a different type of partner, although with a much lower intensity than 
in the case of the same partnership group. The highest persistence is observed for firms that 
performed cooperation agreements with research institutions at t-1, which have a probability of 
cooperating with clients or suppliers at t around 9 percentage points higher than do firms which did 
not cooperate at t-1 with such institutions. Among the reasons behind this higher influence of past 
alliances with institutions, we could think on the idea that relations with research centres or 
universities may allow the firm to obtain higher insights on future opportunities for innovation and 
the creation of a next-generation technology. Subsequent to this, the firm may need to start 
technological collaboration agreements with clients or suppliers so that they adapt their processes to 
this new technology. As for the other interrelation patterns across partners, they are also significant 
although of a much lower magnitude. All in all, it seems fair to think that the use of a wide range of 
co-operators as a source of external knowledge can help the firm to achieve and sustain innovation 
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(Becker and Dietz, 2004; Laursen and Salter, 2006). This way, the knowledge diversity gained 
through the collaboration with different types of partners should enhance innovation by enabling 
firms to make linkages and gain a broader spectrum of experiences with diverse partners (Anand 
and Khanna, 2000). 
  
5. Conclusions
 
Our study is an attempt to analyse persistence in R&D cooperation activities and, as a consequence, 
understand innovation in a globalised environment. Initially, persistence in cooperation agreements 
is appealing, as it provides firms with a stream of information that becomes available thanks to 
being embedded in a network. The results show that there is a high persistence in R&D cooperation 
activities at the firm level. After discounting the impact of observed and unobserved firm 
characteristics, a firm cooperating in t-1 has a probability of cooperating which is approximately 34 
percentage points higher than that of a firm not having cooperated in the previous period. This 
could be explained by the knowledge accumulation and capabilities that may be gained from past 
experiences in cooperation projects, the barriers to enter and exit which can arise due to sunk costs, 
and the success and reliability in past cooperation agreements. In addition, we observe that firms 
with higher incoming spillovers, higher R&D intensity, large firms and firms that belong to a group 
of enterprises as well as firms that use protection methods (such as patenting, registered an 
industrial design, trademark or copyright) are more persistent in their technological collaborative 
agreements. 
 
When taking into account the different types of partnership, we conclude that the highest 
persistence is found in the case of collaboration with institutions, followed by customers and clients. 
One potential explanation may be related to the relative limited spillovers risks in those types of 
alliances if compared to the one in agreements with competitors, which may imply a higher 
persistence of the former alliances. Finally, in all the types of partners, we obtain that cooperation 
agreements with one type increase the likelihood of cooperating in the future with a different type 
of partner, although with a much lower intensity than in the case of the same partnership group.  
 
From a policy view, the fact of R&D cooperation being state dependent implies that collaboration-
stimulating policy measures, such as government support programmes, are supposed to have a 
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deeper effect because they do not only affect current collaboration agreements but are also likely to 
induce a permanent change in favour of cooperation. In addition, since persistence is also driven by 
certain individual characteristics of the firms, they could be taken into account when designing 
policies to stimulate cooperation in a persistent way: firms with high R&D intensity, large firms and 
firms that belong to a group of enterprises as well as firms that use protection methods. Policy 
makers could decide to focus resources on “cooperation-survival-winners”.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the panel data sets used 
  Unbalanced panel Balanced panel 
Number of observations 25,364 16,016 
Number of firms 7,566 4,004 
Number of consecutive obs. per firm >=2 4 
Average number of consecutive obs. 3.4 4 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables in the empirical analysis 
Unbalanced Balanced 
mean 
std. dev. 
mean 
std. dev. 
  overall between within  overall between within 
Cooperation_t-1 0.382 0.486 0.414 0.268 0.409 0.492 0.395 0.293 
Incoming spillovers 0.363 0.277 0.240 0.151 0.380 0.275 0.223 0.161 
Legal protection 0.357 0.479 0.408 0.266 0.377 0.485 0.387 0.291 
R&D intensity 0.075 0.245 0.240 0.083 0.071 0.233 0.216 0.086 
Firm size 314.244 1430.165 1440.760 280.152 334.356 1305.782 1277.710 269.809
Local funding 0.300 0.458 0.390 0.252 0.321 0.467 0.379 0.273 
National funding 0.269 0.444 0.370 0.250 0.296 0.456 0.366 0.273 
European funding 0.074 0.261 0.220 0.139 0.083 0.276 0.228 0.155 
Belonging to a group 0.416 0.493 0.472 0.147  0.442 0.497 0.470 0.160 
 
Table 3. Transition probabilities matrix 
    Cooperation in t 
Unbalanced panel Balanced panel 
Cooperation 
in   
Non-
cooperation Cooperation  
Non-
cooperation Cooperation 
t-1 Non-cooperation 83.70 16.30 82.50 17.50 Cooperation 29.24 70.76 27.39 72.61 
t-2 Non-cooperation 78.22 21.78 77.63 22.37 Cooperation 39.01 60.99 36.99 63.01 
t-3 
Non-cooperation 73.35 26.65 73.35 26.65 
Cooperation 43.43 56.57  42.89 57.11 
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Table 4. Marginal effects from dynamic random effects probit model
 Unbalanced panel  Balanced panel 
 Random effects probit 
Wooldridge 
correction 
 Random effects 
probit 
Wooldridge 
correction 
Cooperation i,t-1 (persistence) 0.473*** 0.337***  0.470*** 0.329*** 
 (0.008) (0.018)  (0.011) (0.020) 
Cooperation i,t0 (initial conditions)  0.188***   0.204*** 
  (0.021)   (0.024) 
Incoming spillovers 0.095*** 0.106***  0.090*** 0.099*** 
 (0.016) (0.018)  (0.020) (0.024) 
Legal protection 0.035*** 0.040***  0.036*** 0.041*** 
 (0.009) (0.010)  (0.011) (0.013) 
R&D intensity 0.088*** 0.107***  0.096*** 0.123*** 
 (0.024) (0.028)  (0.035) (0.042) 
Firm size (base <50 employees)      
50 – 249 emp 0.039*** 0.046***  0.038*** 0.047*** 
 (0.010) (0.012)  (0.013) (0.016) 
250 – 499 emp 0.056*** 0.067***  0.056*** 0.070*** 
 (0.016) (0.020)  (0.020) (0.025) 
500 or more emp 0.102*** 0.119***  0.097*** 0.115*** 
 (0.018) (0.022)  (0.023) (0.028) 
Public funding for innovation      
Local funding 0.096*** 0.099***  0.103*** 0.103*** 
 (0.010) (0.011)  (0.013) (0.015) 
National funding 0.099*** 0.104***  0.098*** 0.101*** 
 (0.011) (0.012)  (0.013) (0.015) 
European funding 0.119*** 0.124***  0.133*** 0.134*** 
 (0.019) (0.022)  (0.023) (0.027) 
Belonging to a group 0.062*** 0.071***  0.077*** 0.091*** 
 (0.010) (0.012)  (0.013) (0.015) 
Industry dummies Included Included  Included Included 
Time dummies Included Included  Included Included 
Observations 17,568 17,568  12,012 12,012 
Number of firms 7,566 7,566  4,004 4,004 
Log L -8418.381 -8370.928  -5852.373 -5809.207 
Wald test (2) 5007.341 3605.362  3256.116 2339.050 
 Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000  Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000 
Rho () 0.049 0.288  0.080 0.320 
Likelihood test (H0: =0) 4.375 78.444  7.681 77.860 
 Pval = 0.018 Pval = 0.000  Pval = 0.003 Pval = 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses                                                                                                                  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Marginal effects from dynamic random effects probit model (unbalanced panel)
 Random effects probit 
Wooldridge 
correction 
 Random effects 
probit 
Wooldridge 
correction 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Cooperation i,t-1  0.483*** 0.482***    
 (0.011) (0.011)    
Cooperation i,t-2 0.138*** 0.121***    
 (0.014) (0.020)    
Coop i,t-2/t-1=0    0.082*** 0.057*** 
    (0.012) (0.021) 
Cooperation i,t0   0.022   0.026 
  (0.018)   (0.017) 
Incoming spillovers 0.106*** 0.106***  0.030* 0.030* 
 (0.022) (0.022)  (0.016) (0.016) 
Legal protection 0.050*** 0.050***  0.033*** 0.034*** 
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.010) (0.010) 
R&D intensity 0.048 0.047  0.012 0.012 
 (0.035) (0.035)  (0.033) (0.033) 
Firm size (base <50 employees)      
50 – 249 emp 0.041*** 0.041***  0.025** 0.025** 
 (0.014) (0.014)  (0.011) (0.011) 
250 – 499 emp 0.065*** 0.065***  0.040** 0.041** 
 (0.022) (0.022)  (0.019) (0.019) 
500 or more emp 0.109*** 0.109***  0.075*** 0.076*** 
 (0.024) (0.024)  (0.023) (0.024) 
Public funding for innovation      
Local funding 0.102*** 0.101***  0.051*** 0.050*** 
 (0.014) (0.014)  (0.012) (0.013) 
National funding 0.099*** 0.099***  0.066*** 0.067*** 
 (0.015) (0.015)  (0.014) (0.014) 
European funding 0.079*** 0.079***  0.051 0.051 
 (0.028) (0.028)  (0.031) (0.032) 
Belonging to a group 0.042*** 0.042***  0.013 0.013 
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.010) (0.010) 
Industry dummies Included Included  Included Included 
Time dummies Included Included  Included Included 
Observations 10,002 10,002  6,104 6,104 
Number of firms 5,998 5,998  4,133 4,133 
Log L -4441.680 -4440.926  -2369.920 -2368.611 
Wald test (2) 2438.253 2438.502  298.691 125.828 
 Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000  Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000 
Rho () 0.066 0.067  0.001 0.080 
Likelihood test (H0: =0) 2.995 3.008  0.001 0.173 
 Pval = 0.042  Pval = 0.041  Pval = 0.491  Pval = 0.339  
Standard errors in parentheses                                                                                                                  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Transition probabilities matrix – Type of cooperation  
Unbalanced panel Balanced panel 
  
Non-
cooperation Cooperation
Non-
cooperation Cooperation 
Vertical cooperation in t 
Vertical 
cooperation
in t-1 
Non-cooperation 89.10 10.90 88.19 11.81 
Cooperation 37.24 62.76 34.86 65.14 
Horizontal cooperation in t 
Horizontal 
cooperation
in t-1 
Non-cooperation 95.32 4.68 95.01 4.99 
Cooperation 47.65 52.35 45.84 54.16 
Institutional cooperation in t 
Institutional 
cooperation
in t-1 
Non-cooperation 88.63 11.37 87.68 12.32 
Cooperation 31.59 68.41 30.17 69.83 
Table 7. Marginal effects from dynamic random effects probit model – Type of cooperation (unbalanced 
panel)
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 Vertical cooperation 
Horizontal 
cooperation 
Institutional 
cooperation 
Vertical 
cooperation 
Horizontal 
cooperation 
Institutional 
cooperation 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Vertical cooperation i,t-1 0.288***   0.251*** 0.016*** 0.056*** 
 (0.022)   (0.022) (0.004) (0.011) 
Horizontal cooperation i,t-1  0.115***  0.053*** 0.098*** 0.033** 
  (0.025)  (0.013) (0.023) (0.015) 
Institutional cooperation i,t-1   0.294*** 0.092*** 0.024*** 0.275*** 
   (0.021) (0.009) (0.004) (0.022) 
Vertical cooperation i,t0 0.135***   0.120***   
 (0.018)   (0.018)   
Horizontal cooperation i,t0  0.057***   0.046***  
  (0.011)   (0.010)  
Institutional cooperation i,t0   0.189***   0.179*** 
   (0.021)   (0.021) 
Incoming spillovers 0.068*** 0.028*** 0.086*** 0.049*** 0.022*** 0.076*** 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.014) (0.012) (0.005) (0.015) 
Legal protection 0.021*** 0.003 0.036*** 0.016** 0.001 0.034*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) 
R&D intensity 0.046*** 0.009* 0.077*** 0.039** 0.007 0.076*** 
 (0.016) (0.005) (0.020) (0.016) (0.005) (0.020) 
Firm size (base <50 employees)       
50 – 249 emp 0.036*** 0.011*** 0.030*** 0.036*** 0.010*** 0.027*** 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.010) 
250 – 499 emp 0.053*** 0.017*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.015** 0.046*** 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.017) (0.014) (0.006) (0.017) 
500 or more emp 0.104*** 0.027*** 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.022*** 0.089*** 
 (0.017) (0.008) (0.020) (0.017) (0.007) (0.019) 
Public funding for innovation       
Local funding 0.054*** 0.015*** 0.087*** 0.038*** 0.011*** 0.085*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) 
National funding 0.062*** 0.020*** 0.098*** 0.050*** 0.017*** 0.096*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) 
European funding 0.045*** 0.031*** 0.106*** 0.028** 0.026*** 0.097*** 
 (0.015) (0.007) (0.019) (0.014) (0.007) (0.018) 
Belonging to a group 0.042*** 0.007** 0.020** 0.039*** 0.006** 0.019** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 17,568 17,568 17,568 17,568 17,568 17,568 
Number of firms 7,566 7,566 7,566 7,566 7,566 7,566 
Log L -6892.452 -3648.657 -7008.542 -6815.628 -3592.438 -6988.545 
Wald test (2) 2966.723 1659.641 3450.835 3146.194 1775.496 3521.336 
 Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000 
Rho () 0.249 0.297 0.301 0.223 0.261 0.286 
Likelihood test (H0: =0) 47.277 39.453 68.394 38.404 30.518 61.847 
 Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses                                                                                                                            *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A2. Correlation between the explanatory variables 
and their corresponding within means 
Incoming spillovers 0.839 
Legal protection 0.832 
R&D intensity 0.941 
Firm size 0.981 
Local funding 0.836 
National funding 0.826 
European funding 0.846 
Belonging to a group 0.954 
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